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Auditors' Judgments and Decisions Under Time 
Pressure: An Illustration and Agenda For Research1 
Ira Solomon 
Clifton  Brown 
University of  Illinois-Urbana 
Time limitation when acquiring and processing information  (i.e., time pres-
sure) is a structural feature  of  many judgments and decision contexts. In emer-
gency situations, for  example, physicians must process a variety of  information 
within critically small time spans to make diagnoses and identify  appropriate 
courses of  treatment. Similarly, after  leaving a huddle, a football  quarterback 
must appraise the formation  of  the defensive  team within no more than thirty 
seconds to determine if  a change in the planned offensive  play is warranted. 
Likewise, traders working within investment banking houses often  must decide 
within a highly constrained period of  time whether to buy, sell or hold specific 
securities based on a variety of  data about economic and political events. 
Various types of  time constraints are present in auditing contexts [AICPA, 
1978]. For example, auditors are required to perform  audit procedures within 
prescribed time limits (e.g., vouch a specified  number of  transactions to sup-
porting documents within a given period of  time). Consistently, auditors must 
meet various client-imposed (e.g., allow earnings to be released within six 
weeks of  the client's year end) and non-client-imposed deadlines (e.g., file  a 
10-K with the SEC by a specified  date). Although such time constraints have 
always been present within the audit context, it has been argued that recently 
they have increased as competition in the market for  audit services has 
increased [National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987]. 
While often  identified  as deleterious [AICPA, 1978; Alderman and Deitrick, 
1982; Kelly and Margheim, 1990], very little actually is known about the judg-
ment and decision effects  of  time pressure in audit and other applied contexts. 
Interestingly, in non-audit contexts, time constraints in the form  of  time budgets 
sometimes have been found  to enhance efficiency  [Pachella, 1974]. Although it 
has been argued that some time pressure may stimulate auditors to work harder 
and otherwise strive for  efficiencies  [Kelly and Seiler, 1982; Kermis and 
Mahapatra, 1985], no systematic evidence exists on functional  consequences of 
time pressure in auditing. Rather extant audit studies almost exclusively have 
1 The study described herein was funded  by KPMG Peat Marwick through a Research Opportunities 
in Auditing Grant. The authors also acknowledge the assistance of  John Naughton and personnel in 
the Chicago office  of  KPMG who have generously shared their insights on the issues upon which 
this paper is focused.  An earlier version of  this paper was presented in an accounting workshop at 
the University of  Florida. 
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addressed "audit quality" reductions as a consequence of  time pressure using 
one of  two research methods. 
In particular, surveys have been used by various researchers [Alderman and 
Deitrick, 1982; Kelly and Margheim, 1990] who primarily have focussed  on 
extreme time pressure and attendant auditor responses. Laboratory experimenta-
tion has been used by other researchers [McDaniel, 1990; 1992; Choo and Firth, 
1992] and, because auditor-subjects and audit tasks were employed, the experi-
mental studies have greater potential to elucidate audit time pressure effects 
than psychology studies which primarily have employed student subjects per-
forming  "generic" tasks. Experimental studies also have the usual advantage 
(vis-à-vis  audit time pressure survey studies) of  greater control and the con-
comitant advantage of  enhanced power. Unfortunately,  as is argued below, 
common features  of  the experimental studies limit what actually can be dis-
cerned about time pressure effects  in natural audit settings. As discussed later, 
the primary feature  of  concern is the restrictive way in which the experimental 
tasks have been defined  which, in turn, has restricted opportunities for  experi-
mental subjects to adapt  strategically to time pressures. In our view, this char-
acteristic of  prior research has constrained the experienced auditor from  demon-
strating an ability to cope with time pressure and, in turn, may have resulted in 
an overstatement of  the deleterious effects  of  audit time pressure. 
The purpose of  the present paper is to describe how research efforts  devoted 
to elucidating the effects  of  time pressure can be more profitably  spent. This 
objective is accomplished by describing the results of  an illustrative time pres-
sure experiment designed to mimic the features  of  the aforementioned  experi-
mental studies, developing a taxonomy for  analyzing audit time pressure ef-
fects,  and based on that taxonomy, describing an embryonic agenda for  future 
research on time pressure in audit contexts. We begin by describing the results 
of  the illustrative experiment which is focused  on the effects  of  time pressure on 
auditors' judgment policies. This experimental study is described first  so that it 
can serve as a vehicle for  highlighting the shortcomings of  extant audit time 
pressure research. In the subsequent section, using psychology research on 
adaptive judgment formulation  and decision making [Payne, Bettman and 
Johnson, 1988; 1990], we present and discuss a rudimentary taxonomy of  time 
pressure effects  in audit contexts. This taxonomy then is used to characterize 
extant research and, in the next section, to suggest how future  audit time pres-
sure research efforts  profitably  could be redirected. Following presentation of 
the resultant research agenda, concluding remarks complete the paper. 
An Experimental Illustration 
To illustrate how time pressure has been investigated in prior audit studies, 
we introduced time pressure into the experimental setting of  a recently pub-
lished paper [Brown and Solomon, 1990]. The focus  of  Brown and Solomon 
was auditor patterned (configural)  information  processing while assessing inter-
nal control risk. Introducing time pressure into such a study might be motivated 
by the simple recognition that time pressure is present in auditing and has been 
shown in psychology studies to cause judges and decision makers to: 1) be more 
erratic in usage of  their judgment policies [Rothstein, 1986], 2) restrict their 
focus  to a subset of  available information  cues [Wallsten and Barton, 1982; 
Wright, 1974; and Christensen-Szalanski, 1980], 3) alter global judgment and 
decision policies [Billings and Scherer, 1988], 4) access less relevant informa-
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tion [Bowden, 1985] and 5) make less risky choices [Ben Zur and Brenitz, 
1981]. To facilitate  comparison with non-time pressured results, the same mode 
of  analysis, analysis of  variance (ANOVA), is used to represent each auditor-
subject's information-processing  strategy. The specific  research question to be 
investigated is: 
Time pressure will have an inverse impact on the extent of  auditors' con-
figural  information  processing. That is, the proportion of  judgment vari-
ance attributable by an ANOVA judgment model to expected interactions 
will decrease (increase) as time pressure increases (decreases). 
The Audit Judgment Task 
The experimental task, more fully  described in Brown and Solomon [1990], 
is assessment of  interrelated internal controls in clients' information  and busi-
ness control systems. The specific  control system component is cash disburse-
ments and, in particular, assessment of  the risk that cash disbursements are 
materially misstated as a result of  checks being written and/or disbursed for  im-
proper (unauthorized/invalid) purposes. Within control systems, a weakness 
(i.e, increased risk of  misstated financial  statements) caused by the absence of  a 
control (e.g., separation of  duties such as check signing and cash disbursement 
processing/recording) may be at least partially offset  by the presence of  another 
control (e.g., an independent, second check signer). Further, strengths due to the 
presence of  a control (e.g., the separation of  cash disbursements duties) may be 
amplified  by the addition of  another control (e.g., internal audit of  payments). 
The information-processing  strategies appropriate for  evaluating such an 
internal control system component is configural  in nature (also see Hitt and 
Barr, [1989]). In particular, this strategy involves the fully  conditional question, 
"Is the primary separation-of-cash-disbursements-duties  control present?" 
When the auditor's answer to this question is "yes," another question must be 
Figure 1 
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asked: "Are other controls present that amplify  the primary control's effective-
ness?" When the auditor's answer to this other question is "yes," the risk of 
improper cash disbursements is lower than when the answer is "no." However, 
when the auditor's answer to the first  question is "no," a different  question must 
be asked: "Are other controls present that compensate for  the weakness caused 
by the primary control's absence?" When the auditor's answer to this question 
is "no," the risk of  improper cash disbursements should be judged to be higher 
than when the answer is "yes" (when the answer is "yes," the risk could be as 
low as when the separation-of-cash-disbursements-duties  control is present). 
When this judgment strategy is modeled using ANOVA, a significant  portion 
of  improper-cash-disbursement-risk judgment variance will be accounted for  by 
ordinal interactions between the primary and secondary internal controls (see 
Panels A and B in Figure 1 for  graphic representations), as well as by the main 
effects  for  the controls that are involved in those interactions. Further, these 
interactions, because of  their ordinal forms,  will account for  less judgment vari-
ation within the described judgment strategies than the main effects  for  the 
interactions' component controls. 
Subjects 
The initial subject pool consisted of  seventy-four  CPAs with three to four 
years of  experience in financial-statement  auditing (in addition to having col-
lege degrees with majors in accounting), and were employed by the same large, 
international CPA firm.  Auditors with three-four  years of  experience have per-
formed  as part of  actual audits the task employed in this study. Further, drawing 
the subjects from  those with similar extent of  experience should, at least in part, 
control for  differences  in task knowledge between subjects. 
The subjects participated either in one of  the firm's  offices  (twelve subjects) 
or while attending a technical training school run by the firm  (sixty-two sub-
jects). Based upon a pre-test (described below), twenty-three of  these subjects 
participated in the current study. 
Variables 
The research design was a completely randomized one-factor  design involv-
ing a pre- and a post-test. The single factor  was time pressure which was manip-
ulated at two levels: self-regulated  (i.e., no time pressure) and a per-judgment 
time limit (i.e., time pressure). Because other constructs can differ  between sub-
jects that could affect  information  processing abilities (e.g., reading compre-
hension of  task materials and task familiarity),  time pressure was defined  rela-
tive to each individual. Under time pressure, therefore,  a subject's per-judgment 
time limit was defined  to be one-half  of  the average per-judgment time taken for 
his (her) last eight pre-test judgments (see below).2 
Nested within both the pre- and post-test is a within-subjects one-half  frac-
tional replication of  a 25 factorial  manipulation of  task information  cues. This 
factorial  manipulation involved five  information  cues specific  to the internal 
control assessment task, each cue at two levels. An example of  the task stimuli 
is presented in Exhibit 1. One control question (D) contains three related sepa-
2 A number of  time-pressure "fractions  were examined in a pilot test using CPAs. The fraction  "one-
half  was selected based on a desire to induce an effect  but to not overwhelm the subject's ability to 
perform  meaningfully  the task. 
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Exhibit 1 
An Example of  a Cash Disbursement Internal Controls Questionnaire 
Control Question Yes No 
A. Are protective writing devices used to inscribe amounts on checks? X 
B. Are properly approved vouchers required for  check preparation? X 
C. Are all check signers designated by the Board of  Directors? X 
D. Are the primary check signers independent of: 
1. Purchasing and those requesting expenditures? X 
2. Persons approving vouchers? X 
3. Persons processing and recording cash disbursements? X 
E. Is an independent second check signer required who carefully 
scrutinizes the supporting documentation? X 
F. Does internal audit investigate payments made to payees not on 
an independently approved payee listing? X 
Given the controls as represented above, assess the RISK that cash disbursements could be 
materially misstated AS A RESULT OF checks being written and/or disbursed for  improper 
(unauthorized and/or invalid) purposes. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
NO MAXIMUM 
RISK RISK 
ration-of-cash-disbursements-duties  controls. Another control question (E) is a 
preventive cash disbursements control, and still another control question (F) is a 
detective cash disbursements control. The remainder of  the control questions (A 
through C) were intended to be cash disbursements controls not highly related 
to the stated cash disbursements control objective. Five of  the six control ques-
tions (A, C, D2 and D3 jointly, E and F) were factorially  manipulated at two 
levels each (Yes or No), and two questions (B and D1) were held constant 
(Yes). Subjects were asked to assess the risk of  a material misstatement in cash 
disbursement accounts. The risk assessments were elicited on a 100-point scale, 
where zero was no risk and 100 was maximum risk. Consistent with Brown and 
Solomon [1990], the predicted effects  are interactions involving two pairs of 
control questions (D2/D3 and E; and D2/D3 and F). 
An ANOVA judgment-model was computed for  each auditor's risk assess-
ments. Although each auditor judgment-model estimated all main effects  (5) 
and two-way interactions (10), the higher-order (three, four  and five-way)  inter-
actions were aliases of  the estimated effects  and thus, were assumed to be negli-
gible. In addition, because each auditor-model has only one observation per 
cell, such models are determined fully  and no error estimate exists. The judg-
ment variance attributed to each term within an auditor-model, therefore,  was 
computed by dividing the sum of  squares for  the term by the total sum of 
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squares for  the model. Further, an arbitrary criterion of  greater than or equal to 
four  percent of  total judgement variance was used to determine significance 
(i.e., terms with less than four  percent of  total judgment variance are assumed to 
have been caused by random variation rather than systematic effects). 3 
The following  dependent measures were determined for  each individual: 
M i j 1 = V i j 2 - V i j 1 , 
where V i j n is the proportion of  judgment variance that the ith individual's 
model attributed to the jth dependent variable of  interest determined both from 
the pre-test (n=1) and the experiment (n=2). The dependent variable (M i j 1) is 
further  categorized into each individual's random assignment to the time pres-
sure (1=1,2) variable. The dependent variables of  interest were expected inter-
actions, main effects  of  expected interaction component controls, all above-cri-
terion main effects,  all above-criterion interactions, and below-criterion judg-
ment variance. 
Procedures 
The laboratory session consisted of  three sections: training, pre-testing and 
testing. All sections were presented on personal computers, and subjects com-
pleted the sections at their own pace (other than the time-pressured condition in 
the testing section). The training section began with brief  instructions on the 
personal computer, and was followed  by a practice case involving the general 
task but set in a context different  from  the pre-testing/testing case. The practice 
case was intended to allow subjects to gain familiarity  with the response scale 
and the decisions aids available in the subsequent sections. The decision aids 
were intended to reduce subject memory load and to control extraneous vari-
ance.4 The training section continued with presentation of  the internal control 
case, and was followed  by a blank copy of  the task stimuli and additional 
instructions (see Appendix A).5 The subjects then responded to a series of  ques-
tions designed to stimulate prior thought about each item listed in their stimuli 
and its relation to the specific  audit objective for  which they were being asked 
to make risk assessments. 
In the pre-testing section, the subjects were presented sequentially with the 
sixteen judgment trials (internal control questionnaires) from  one of  the half-
replications (randomized over subjects). The order of  the judgment trials (i.e., 
information  combinations) within each half-replication  was randomized for 
each subject. In addition, the order of  the stimuli items in the judgment trials 
was counter-balanced; one-half  of  the subjects received one order and the other 
one-half  received a second order. Upon completion of  the pre-test half-replica-
3 Results of  a pilot study (n=12) employing a full  twenty-five  factorial  design and earlier versions of 
the cases, indicated that effects  > 2 percent of  total risk assessment variation were significant  when 
using the higher-order (three-, four-,  and five-way)  interactions as error estimates. 
4 The two decision aids were an electronic file  and a logical consistency checker. When assessing 
risk, the subject had access to an electronic file  of  judgement trials that he or she had already evalu-
ated (previous evaluations could not be changed). As the subject worked through the judgment tri-
als, the computer reviewed their assessments for  logical consistency (i.e., dominance conditions). If 
the computer detected an apparent logical inconsistency, that fact  was displayed, and the subject had 
the option of  either changing or maintaining his or her assessment of  the current judgement trial. 
5 The subjects were instructed 1) to ignore the temporal sequence of  the judgement trials and 2) that 
the trials would represent a mixture of  possible situations. Further, the subjects were told that, 
although some situations may occur less frequently  than others in practice, they should not allow 
such frequency  to affect  their risk assessments. 
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Table 1 
Mean Risk Assessments Over Levels of Expected Interaction Terms Within Judgment Models 
Interaction Time 
Pre-Test 
Expected Interaction levels' 
Post-Test 
Expected Interaction Levels' 





7 32.20 52 00 54 30 60 70 
5 13.50 49 80 64.00 70 50 
8 20.10 27.10 38.10 68.70 
6 16.40 26.70 31.20 62.30 
30 40 42.10 49 80 58 20 
15 00 48 50 62 00 73.50 
20.40 28.00 49 90 63.30 
15.70 28.50 32.90 60.20 
*The expected interaction levels are labeled as follows: variable 1 (variable 2) is the first (second) element in a 
label, and "+" and"-" is the variable level. Both the variable and variable levels are the same as identifed in 
tion, the percent of  judgment variance attributable to the appropriate interaction 
was calculated for  each subject.6 When this percent was less than the four  per-
cent of  total judgment variance criterion, the subject's participation in the ex-
periment was ended. Alternatively, when this percent was greater than the crite-
rion, the subject continued to the testing section of  the experiment. Using this 
pre-test to filter  those subjects who had not yet learned the appropriate judg-
ment strategy should at least partially control for  task knowledge differences 
between subjects. 
Continuing subjects next were randomly assigned to one of  the two levels of 
the time pressure variable (i.e., either no time pressure or time pressure). 
Subjects assigned to the time pressure condition were informed  of  their per-
judgment time limit (as well as the basis for  determining such limit). Following 
this, subjects were presented sequentially with the sixteen judgment trials from 
the other half-replication.  Procedures for  these trials were the same as for  the 
pre-test, except for  those subjects with judgment time limits. After  completing 
these judgment trials, the subjects responded to a post-experimental question-
naire. 
As a validity check, each subject's expected pre-test interaction was inspect-
ed. Table 1 presents the mean risk assessments across the levels of  the expected 
interactions for  each level of  time pressure. Since two possible ordinal interac-
tion forms  (compensating and amplifying)  were expected for  the internal con-
trol evaluation task, the means for  both forms  are presented. The inspections 
disclose that each subject's pre-test interaction was in a form  consistent with the 
expectation (see Figure 1 for  the expected forms). 
Time pressure had a significant  effect  on changes in proportion of  judgment 
variance attributed to the expected interactions. The proportions of  judgment 
variance attributed to the expected interactions exhibited greater changes from  a 
non-time pressured pre-test to a post-test when subjects' post-tests were time 
pressured. When the post-test was not time pressured, the mean change (from 
pre-test to post-test) in the proportion of  judgment variance attributed to the 
expected interactions was -1.56 (from  8.68 to 7.12 percent of  judgment vari-
ance, see Table 2). When the post-test was time pressured, however, the mean 
change was -5.76 (from  8.13 to 2.46 percent of  judgment variance, see Table 2). 
The decline in judgment variance attributed to the expected interactions was 
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significantly  greater when the post-test was time pressured than when it was not 
time pressured (t(21) = 2.85; p<0.002). 
Time pressure also had significant  effects  on changes in the amount of 
below-criterion judgment variance (i.e., judgment error). The proportions of 
below-criterion judgment variance exhibited greater changes from  a non-time 
pressured pre-test to a post-test when subjects' post-tests were time pressured. 
When the post-test was not time pressured, the mean change (from  pre-test to 
post-test) was -0.71 decreasing from  9.28 to 8.57 percent of  judgment variance. 
When the post-test was time pressured, however, the mean change was 4.44 
increasing from  6.49 to 10.94 percent of  judgment variance. 
In sum, auditor-subjects' information  processing strategies as captured by 
ANOVA judgment models were affected  significantly  by the imposition of  time 
pressure. Generally, time pressure resulted in a decrease in configural  informa-
tion processing (as captured by the sum of  all above-criterion interaction terms 
as well as the expected interaction terms). Furthermore, this decrease in config-
ural information  processing was accompanied by an increase in both non-
configural  processing (as captured by the sum of  all above-criterion main 
effects)  and in judgment instability (as captured by the sum of  below-criterion 
terms). 
Discussion 
To the extent that configural  information  processing is believed to be appro-
priate in connection with the experimental task, time pressure would be viewed 
as having had a deleterious effect  on the auditor-subjects' performance.  Such a 
conclusion would be consistent with expectations based on: 1) audit studies 
reporting survey data concerned with pathological time-pressure responses such 
as premature sign-off  [Kelly and Margheim, 1990; Alderman and Deitrick, 
1982], 2) psychology studies using student subjects who generally would be 
expected to have little knowledge of,  or experience in, managing the time pres-
sures created in their experimental tasks [e.g., Rothstein, 1986; Wright, 1974], 
and 3) the few  extant experimental studies using auditor subjects. 
Elaborating on the experimental auditing studies, Choo and Firth [1992] 
described a study in which auditor-subjects assessed the risk that recorded 
accounts receivable did not exist under one of  three levels of  time pressure. The 
auditor subjects were given evidence from  specified  audit procedures (e.g., con-
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firmation,  inspection of  subsequent collections, etc.) as the basis for  their risk 
assessments.7 This task is the same as that of  experiment one in Brown and 
Solomon [1991], and although both studies were focussed  on configural  pro-
cessing, Choo and Firth introduced time pressure in an effort  to increase exter-
nal validity. The results of  Choo and Firth were consistent with those of  the 
experimental illustration—configural  processing was reduced by time pressure. 
Other recent experimental studies of  time pressure effects  in audit settings 
include the two related studies by McDaniel [1990; 1992]. In these studies, 
auditor-subjects performed  an experimental task related to the year-end invento-
ry audit procedures for  a hypothetical auditee. Her subjects, assigned to one of 
two levels of  time pressure in McDaniel [1990] and one of  four  levels of  time 
pressure in McDaniel [1992], were required to identify  and document seeded 
pricing and omission errors relevant to finished  goods inventory and the related 
reserve account. For each of  four  objectives (completeness and valuation for  the 
inventory asset and reserve accounts), the auditor-subjects determined which 
audit procedure to apply, the sample selection method and sample size to 
employ, and the conclusions to be reached based on the resultant evidence. 
McDaniel's [1990] results were that time pressure decreased audit effective-
ness, enhanced audit efficiency  only when the time pressure manipulation was 
extreme, and had enhanced auditor consistency by eliminating overly large sam-
ple sizes. Although McDaniel [1992] used the same task as McDaniel [1990], 
the focus  of  the later study was different.  For present purposes, the most ger-
mane of  her results was that when faced  with time pressure, auditors may 
change the decision-making strategy they employ. 
The results of  these studies generally are consistent-time pressure had a 
largely deleterious effect  on auditor judgment and decision making. Before 
etching this general proposition in stone, however, it is instructive to consider 
some of  the features  of  the experimental illustration and the other experimental 
studies of  auditor judgments and decisions under time pressure. In particular, 
notice that in both the illustrative experiment and Choo and Firth [1992], time 
pressure was unknown to the auditor until he/she was to perform  a specific  task. 
Further, these tasks were rather rigidly defined  such that the auditor could only 
adopt limited tactical measures (e.g., work faster).  Specifically  precluded, there-
fore,  were strategic measures to negate the effects  of  time pressure, such as 
bringing more resources to bear on the task, altering the audit strategy, and re-
defining  the scope of  the task.8 
While some additional tactical measures could be adopted, constraints on 
strategic responses also were effectively  imposed on the auditor-subjects in the 
7 Choo and Eggleton [1982] also investigated time-pressure effects  using auditor-subjects. The 
results of  that study are similar to that of  the present illustrative study with the exception that con-
figural  processing seemed to be greater under time pressure than under no time pressure. This result 
should be interpreted with caution, however, because configural  processing was measured on an ex 
post basis as the sum of  all two- and three-way interactions rather than on an ex ante basis for  pre-
dicted interactions. In addition, the time pressure manipulation in Choo and Eggleton was between-
subjects and there only were five  subjects in each condition. 
8 In this paper strategic responses are considered to be the establishment of  audit goals and objec-
tives as well as management control required to implement such goals and policies (e.g., audit pro-
gram planning, audit work assignments, and review of  audit work). Tactical responses, on the other 
hand, are considered to be the methods and procedures employed to effectively  and efficiently  per-
form  the planned audit tasks. These definitions  are similar to those employed by the management 
control literature [Anthony. Dearden and Govidarajan, 1992]. 
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McDaniel [1990; 1992] studies. Nevertheless, McDaniel [1992], did report 
some evidence that auditors' behavior may be contingent upon task and context 
features  such as time pressure. Consistently, a study by Kermis and Mahapatra 
[1985] also reported evidence suggesting that auditors take various tactical steps 
to cope with time pressure depending upon its severity. For example, it was 
reported by Kermis and Mahapatra that the amount of  time devoted to some 
audit procedures may be reduced while the time allocated to other procedures 
may be increased.9 Although some audit time pressure studies have permitted 
limited tactical responses to audit time pressure, no study has investigated 
strategic responses. Because various strategic options are available to auditors 
in the field,  this is a serious limitation of  audit time pressure research which 
may have caused both an overstatement of  the deleterious effects  of  time pres-
sure on auditor judgments and decisions and constrained the experienced audi-
tor from  demonstrating a superior ability (e.g., relative to students) to cope with 
such pressure. 
The Adaptive Audit Decision Maker: 
A Time-Pressure Taxonomy 
For many years, psychology researchers have argued that judgment and deci-
sion processes as well as the judgments and decisions themselves are influenced 
by a variety of  considerations. More recently, psychology researchers began to 
recognize that judgment formulation  and decision making may be characterized 
by a two-stage process in which the goal of  the first  stage is "deciding how to 
decide" while the second stage goal is to execute the chosen judgment and deci-
sion process [Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1988; 1990]. The conventional wis-
dom has become that during the first  stage of  this process (deciding how to 
decide), the judge/decision maker selects an approach which he or she perceives 
to be most appropriate for  the task at hand [Beach and Mitchell, 1978; Payne, 
1982]. Perceptions of  the appropriateness of  judgment and decision strategies 
have been shown to be influenced  by a variety of  factors  including justifiability 
[Tversky, 1972] and cognitive effort  considerations [Simon, 1955]. Since time 
pressure can be directly related to cognitive effort  (i.e., constrained time gener-
ally requires increased cognitive effort),  the perspective of  people as strategic 
and adaptive decision makers has important, but heretofore  largely unrecog-
nized, implications for  investigating time pressure effects  in audit settings. 
In considering potential time pressure effects  within the auditing environ-
ment it is useful  to employ the taxonomy shown in Figure 2. This taxonomy is 
structured around three variables: whether time pressure was anticipated by the 
decision maker (operationalized as either "yes" or "no"); the extent of  the deci-
sion maker's knowledge about the potential time- pressure effects  within the 
specific  tasks being performed  (operationalized as either "high" or "low"); and 
the nature of  the time-pressure phenomena (either deadline or budget). 
A structural feature  of  audit-engagement time pressure is the nature of  the 
phenomena. That is, time pressure can be manifest  either as "deadline" or as 
9 Kermis and Mahapatra [1985] was an experimental investigation in which time pressure was 
manipulated bewteen-subjects at four  levels (ranging from  no pressure to a 30% reduction from 
prior year's actual hours). The experimental materials, however, were mailed to the subjects. This 
procedural dimension differentiates  the Kermis and Mahapatra study from  the laboratory ex-
periments mentioned earlier. 
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Figure 2 
Time Pressures in Auditing: A Taxonomy 
Anticipation of Pressure 
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"budgetary" pressure. The increasing levels of  competition within public audit-
ing has resulted in substantial pressure to perform  within increasingly stricter 
limits on audit resources allocated to an engagement. The most significant 
(costly) audit resource is auditor labor. Auditors, therefore,  are not only given 
constrained amounts of  time to perform  tasks but are required to account on a 
task-by-task basis for  the amount of  time they actually take to complete each 
major portion of  a task. Thus, budgetary pressure may arise because of  con-
straints on the resources to be allocated in accomplishing particular tasks. For 
example, a requirement that a client's annual audit engagement be completed 
using no more than 200 staff  hours would represent a budgetary pressure. On 
the other hand, deadline pressure may arise when there is a particular point in 
time by which specific  tasks must be complete. For example, a requirement by 
the client that the annual audit opinion be delivered within six weeks of  the fis-
cal year-end may create deadline pressure. These two time-pressure manifesta-
tions, however, may not be entirely independent. For example, one strategy for 
dealing with an unanticipated deadline would be to bring additional audit 
resources to bear in completing the required tasks which, in turn, may create a 
budgetary pressure. 
Within the auditing environment, the extent to which time pressure can be 
anticipated is a critical feature  that separates coping mechanisms into strategic 
and tactical responses. That is, when they are able to anticipate time pressure, 
auditors can strategically modify  the planned audit program to cope with such 
pressure. For example, an expected budgetary pressure could be met with a re-
duction of  substantive tests-of-details  in favor  of  analytical procedures within 
certain areas (e.g., a retailer's fixed  assets) such that sufficient  resources are 
maintained for  other areas (e.g., the retailer's cash receipts and inventories). On 
the other hand, when the time pressure has not been anticipated, many strategic 
responses are precluded and coping may be restricted to tactical responses of  a 
more immediate nature. In the previous illustration, for  example, having per-
formed  planned substantive procedures in a given area precludes reduction of 
such procedures to cope with an unanticipated pressure that arises during the 
execution of  the audit program. When such pressure is an unanticipated dead-
line (e.g., the underwriter of  an IPO wanting the stock issue to be effective  a 
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month earlier than planned) the only effective  response may be to bring addi-
tional audit resources to bear (again, potentially inducing unanticipated bud-
getary pressure). 
Another feature  critical in determining the extent and nature of  time-pressure 
effects  is the auditor's knowledge concerning the dysfunctional  effects  that can 
be caused by the pressure and his or her knowledge of  effective  strategies and 
tactical responses that can be employed to mitigate such effects.  Such knowl-
edge may be more affective  in nature, learned through abstraction and general-
ization of  audit experiences, than learned as a set of  principles within a struc-
tured educational environment. If  so, practicing auditors who have more experi-
ence with audit engagement time pressures should have greater knowledge of 
both time-pressure effects  and coping strategies and tactics. Audit situations in 
which auditors' time pressure-related knowledge was low, therefore,  would not 
be expected to occur frequently.  It is true that junior-level auditors may not 
have acquired sufficient  knowledge with which to understand fully  potential 
time-pressure dysfunctionalities  and to know appropriate responses for  coping 
with such problems. However, viewing audit planning and performance  as a 
team-based technology, senior-level members of  the audit team should have 
sufficient  knowledge (although some audit failures  may have been due, in part, 
to a lack of  such knowledge within the team-as-a-whole). Thus, adequate super-
vision should facilitate  appropriate responses to all but the most rapidly occur-
ring time pressures. The inclusion of  "low" knowledge cells in the taxonomy is 
to facilitate  discussion of  extant academic research involving time pressure. 
Such research largely has employed subjects who, arguably, had low knowledge 
concerning time pressure effects  and appropriate coping mechanisms within the 
experimental tasks in which they were required to perform. 
Analyzing the earlier experiment and Choo and Firth [1992] in terms of  the 
taxonomy presented above, the nature of  the time pressure was budgetary. In 
particular, the amount of  time that could be allocated to making the judgments 
required by the experimental task was limited physically. Since the possibility 
of  time pressure was not known by the subjects until it was imposed, these 
experiments involved unanticipated time-pressure. Additionally, the subjects 
were audit seniors with significant  auditing experience. Given the pre-test in 
which such subjects were filtered  based on their ability to configurally  process 
the information,  all subjects in the illustrative experiment could be assumed to 
have high knowledge of  the underlying phenomena (i.e., controls effective  in 
ensuring that the objectives of  cash disbursements authorization and validity are 
being met). In Choo and Firth, no such pre-test was employed. With respect to 
the subjects' knowledge about appropriate mechanisms for  coping with the spe-
cific  form  of  budgetary pressure employed in the experiment, neither study pro-
vided any evidence. Consequently, we consider the illustrative experiment and 
Choo and Firth to fall  in cell No.7 of  Figure 2, although we acknowledge that a 
case could be made for  cell No. 8. 
In the McDaniel [1990; 1991] studies, the time pressure was budgetary and 
the subjects were audit seniors who should be experienced at performing  the 
experimental tasks. While not specifically  tested in the studies, it is reasonable 
to assume that subjects had sufficient  knowledge of  the underlying phenomenon 
(i.e., substantive testing in connection with the inventory asset and reserve 
accounts) as well as limited experience in coping with the budgetary pressure 
introduced into the experiment. In these respects the McDaniel studies were 
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similar to the illustrative study and to a somewhat lesser extent, Choo and Firth 
[1992]. Also similar, time pressure was not known by the subjects until it was 
imposed. In one important respect, however, the McDaniel studies were differ-
ent from  the other studies. That is, the auditor-subjects were given a little more 
opportunity to use tactical measures to cope with time pressure than in the other 
studies. For example, in the McDaniel studies, the auditors could elect to per-
form  procedures in a specified  order or adjust the order in which they were per-
formed  so that those procedures thought to be more important could be accom-
plished within the allotted time. Nevertheless, the best placement of  the 
McDaniel studies would seem to be cell No. 7 of  Figure 2. 
Audit Time Pressure: An Agenda For Research 
In the preceding section, because the auditor-subjects in each of  the experi-
mental studies reviewed were unaware of  the time pressure until it was 
imposed, it was argued that they were able to adopt some tactical measures 
(e.g., accelerate decision-making, filter  information,  reduce or eliminate more 
complex, and thus more time consuming, configural  cue processing), but were 
effectively  precluded from  employing virtually all strategic mechanisms for 
coping with the pressure. It is our contention that while such situations may be 
of  interest (especially to those interested in applying theories of  harassed deci-
sion making in the audit setting; see Wright, [1974]), to the extent that the goal 
is to paint an objective picture of  the affect  of  time pressure on audit judgments 
and decisions, audit researchers would seem to have over-invested in these 
types of  studies. Further, we contend that one potential consequence of  such 
over-investment is that little presently is known about how and  how well  audi-
tors use strategic  measures in situations for  which time pressures are anticipat-
ed.  A second-order consequence, therefore,  as noted earlier, is that audit re-
search may have overstated the negative consequences of  time pressure. 
Our agenda for  audit time pressure research has both descriptive and evalua-
tive foci  and thus, will address the following  general questions: 
1. What strategies are adopted by knowledgeable auditors to cope with 
anticipated budgetary time pressures? 
2. In what situations do knowledgeable auditors consider these potential 
strategies to be more or less appropriate? 
a. How are such strategies related, if  at all, to the nature and timing of 
the tasks being performed  (e.g., planning audit procedures versus 
executing planned procedures)? 
b. How effective  and efficient  are these strategies (i.e., what are their 
relative costs and benefits)? 
3. To what extent do knowledgeable auditors, when they anticipate bud-
getary time pressure, select the most appropriate strategies? 
To illustrate how these general questions might be operationalized within 
specific  audit contexts, in the remainder of  this section, we identify  select exam-
ples from  the perspective of  cell No. 5 of  Figure 2. Importantly, we also will 
argue that different  research methods (e.g., laboratory experiments, field  experi-
ments, fields  studies) should be employed depending upon the question to be 
addressed and the current state of  knowledge with respect to that question. We 
have selected cell No. 5 because it provides a striking contrast with the cell 
(No. 7) in which the extant research would appear and because it represents 
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frequently  occurring circumstances. Cell No. 5 would arise, for  example, if  an 
audit firm  were to secure a new or continuing engagement through a competi-
tive bidding process which resulted in a relatively low audit fee.  In turn, this 
low audit fee,  is assumed to create budgetary time pressure which is known at 
the onset. Additionally, the auditors are assumed to have the requisite minimum 
task knowledge and are assumed to be experienced in such task performance 
under time pressure. 
An interesting starting point is to consider that if  time pressure were antici-
pated early in the audit, it may be possible for  the auditor to deal with it during 
audit planning by making strategic  administrative  assignments.  That is, in 
assigning auditors to the engagement, it may be possible to substitute more 
experienced and knowledgeable auditors for  less experience/knowledgeable 
auditors in various facets  of  the engagement. Such substitution would seem to 
have at least two potential benefits.  First, to the extent that more experienced/ 
knowledgeable auditors take less time to perform  audit procedures, a direct time 
savings may result. Second, to the extent that more experienced/knowledgeable 
auditors perform  more effectively,  it may be possible to subject their work to a 
somewhat less exhaustive review process. Consistently, even if  the review 
process itself  were not modified,  it would seem reasonable to expect that more 
experienced/knowledgeable auditors would spend less time clearing review 
notes etc. Although strategic administrative choices would seem to be an obvi-
ous mechanism for  coping with audit time pressure, little presently is known 
about the staff  assignment process within audit organizations either in the 
absence or presence of  time pressure. Both descriptive and evaluative research 
of  this type, therefore,  would seem to be of  value. 
Another strategic aspect of  audit planning and administration concerns the 
extent to which audit technology is to be used on an engagement. For example, 
it may be possible to cope, at least partially, with anticipated budgetary time 
pressure by using sophisticated technology such as expert systems. It also may 
be possible to use technology to perform  more extensive and powerful  analyt-
ical procedures [Bailey, Graham and Hansen, 1988]. Closely related to such 
technological options is the choice among the various approaches to producing 
sufficient,  competent audit evidence. That is, as is well known, audit evidence 
may be produced using various mixes of  audit procedures. For example, under 
anticipated budgetary time pressure, auditors may be less likely to plan to per-
form  extensive tests-of-details  or more or less likely to attempt to rely on the 
client's control structure. Auditors also may be more or less likely to use statis-
tical approaches to planning audit sampling. While descriptive research on these 
potential time pressure coping mechanisms would be of  considerable value, it 
also should be obvious that there are attendant audit effectiveness  implications. 
We next shift  our focus  from  strategic planning and administration to strate-
gic execution of  audit activities. For reasons of  expositional parsimony, we 
restrict our focus  to one class of  audit procedures— analytical procedures. This 
class was chosen because performing  analytical procedures requires the auditor 
to perform  the various component judgment and decision activities (i.e., prob-
lem representation, hypothesis formulation,  information  search, information 
processing and hypothesis testing, action choice) found  elsewhere in the audit. 
Consequently, much of  what is presented may be readily generalized to other 
procedure classes. 
The shift  from  planning to an execution perspective, makes salient a variety 
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of  fundamental  questions. In particular, descriptive research on the impact of 
time pressure on each of  the component judgment and decision activities would 
seem to be of  value. For example, how does anticipated budgetary time pressure 
impact auditors' information  search activities and hypothesis-testing strategies? 
At a more basic level, questions like the following  might be posed about auditor 
behavior when faced  with anticipated budgetary time pressure relative to non-
pressured situations: (1) Are auditors more or less pre-disposed to employ sta-
tistical approaches to analytical review? (2) Are auditors more or less pre-dis-
posed to employ decision aids to facilitate  hypothesis formulation?  (3) Do audi-
tors plan to test hypothesis sets which are truncated to a greater or lesser extent? 
(4) Do auditors plan to sequentially test hypotheses and are they predisposed to 
focus  first  on those hypotheses which are more favorable  to the client (e.g., non-
error explanations for  analytical review fluctuations)?  (5) Do auditors make 
greater use of  positive-test strategies? and (6) To what extent are the answers to 
questions like those just posed dependent upon client-specific  factors  (e.g., in-
dustry, risk level etc.)? Again, these are but a few  of  the questions which might 
be addressed to shed light on strategic audit execution under time pressure. 
Shifting  from  execution to the perspective of  a strategic  audit  review 
process, illustrative research questions would seem to be manyfold,  but two are 
most salient. First, how and to what extent do auditors vary the nature and 
extent of  their review activities as a consequence of  time-pressured audit plan-
ning and execution? To elaborate, as previously noted, if  especially experi-
enced/knowledgeable auditors were assigned to the engagement because of  the 
anticipation of  budgetary time pressure, a strategic reviewer might perform  a 
less exhaustive analysis of  portions of  the working papers. In such situations, 
descriptive research documenting the nature of  the strategic review process 
modifications  would seem to be of  value. Second, to what extent does the audit 
review process result in the addition of  audit procedures etc., which may have 
been trimmed during initial execution due to time pressure? 
Before  concluding this section, a few  comments are in order about research 
methods for  investigating questions like those just described and motivations 
for  incorporating time pressure into research contexts. With respect to the for-
mer issue, because different  research methods have different  comparative 
advantages, it would seem to be a mistake to rely to the same extent as prior 
audit time-pressure research on surveys and laboratory experiments. Rather, we 
believe that field  surveys and experiments are appropriate methods to use dur-
ing theory building to investigate many of  the descriptive questions just speci-
fied.  As is the case for  research focussed  on other issues, such methods would 
seem to have the comparative advantage of  facilitating  identification  of  relevant 
variables. In addition, when investigating the audit effectiveness  implications of 
identified  time-pressure coping mechanisms, field  studies would seem to be 
invaluable. For example, field  studies could be conducted to determine the fre-
quency with which audit failures  arise from  time-pressured audit engagements 
as well as the strategic actions taken, if  any, which failed  to effectively  over-
come the time pressure. Only after  the resultant theory has been sufficiently 
developed would laboratory experimentation be efficient. 
Lastly, it recently has been argued that greater representation within research 
contexts of  important audit contextual features  will be critical to the next gener-
ation of  audit judgment and decision research studies [Solomon and Shields, 
1993]. Because time pressure is an ubiquitous feature  of  audit contexts which 
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can have a pervasive impact on auditor judgment and decision making, 
researchers may want to incorporate time pressure into studies designed to 
investigate other audit-judgment and decision-making issues. To illustrate, con-
siderable research has been reported in which the focus  was auditor expertise 
and/or experience effects  [e.g., Davis and Solomon, 1989]. With a few  excep-
tions, those studies have been unable to identify  systematic experience or exper-
tise effects.  But the contexts of  these studies have been rather undeveloped, 
generally not incorporating features  like multi-person interaction, review 
process feedback,  accountability, and time pressure which, in concert, distin-
guish auditing from  other judgment and decision making contexts. One possibil-
ity is that contextual features  like time pressure interact with other aspects of 
judgment and decision making such that the presence of  time pressure is a nec-
essary (or sufficient)  condition for  such aspects to be revealed. Thus, it may be 
that in the presence of  time pressure experienced auditors' judgment and deci-
sion making will exhibit some characteristics often  associated with expertise but 
not (or less so) when time pressure is absent. For example, auditors under time 
pressure may exhibit some parallel information  search and processing strategies 
whereas only serial strategies may be evident when time pressure is absent. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have reviewed extant judgment and decision research on 
the effects  of  time pressure in auditing, described a representative time-pressure 
experimental study, critically analyzed the extant research (including our illus-
trative study), provided a taxonomy for  investigating audit time-pressure effects 
and, based on the taxonomy, described an embryonic agenda for  redirecting 
audit research efforts.  While this agenda was fleshed  out on an illustrative, but 
not exhaustive, basis only for  one of  the cells in the taxonomy, generalization to 
other issues and other cells should be facilitated.  Critical themes in our discus-
sion have been that extant research has not done a good job of  depicting how 
and how well auditors cope with time-pressure effects  in natural settings. This 
critical conclusion rests on the argument that most extant research has precluded 
the auditor from  taking any strategic actions in the presence of  time pressure 
and many tactical actions also have been precluded. Often,  the only available 
options have been to work faster  and when extreme time pressure has been 
introduced, the predictable deleterious effects  were discerned. 
Our approach has been to assume that although in concept extreme time 
pressure may be present, it may be precluded by the various audit organization 
controls. In addition, we have noted that extant research has already document-
ed the obvious—when given no other options except to work harder and when 
this is not enough, work less is what auditors do. However, we also have argued 
that such research can tell us very little about the more common and interesting 
situation in which time pressure is present but less extreme and such time pres-
sure has been anticipated by a knowledgeable and experienced auditor (or audit 
team). Focussing on such situations amounts to a re-direction of  audit time-
pressure research to how and the extent to which the auditor  works  smarter  in 
the presence of  time pressure? 
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Appendix A 
Cash Disbursements Internal Control Case 
Assume you are a senior-level auditor and that one of  your clients is Nortack, 
Inc. Nortack, a large processor and merchandiser of  agricultural commodities, is 
a privately-held company that has debt covenants requiring audited financial 
statements prepared in accordance with GAAP. The company has not presented 
significant  auditing problems during your firm's  five-year  tenure as its public 
auditor. Nortack's management is actively involved both in designing the com-
pany's internal controls, as well as reviewing existing internal controls. The 
employees who administer Nortack's internal controls are well trained and 
supervised, with clearly defined  responsibilities. Nortack has relatively 
autonomous internal audit department that is adequately staffed  and supervised; 
the department head was a manager for  a Big Eight CPA firm,  and most of  the 
internal auditors have CPA certificates.  During the past five  years, Nortack has 
been computerizing its accounting and information  systems. 
Currently, you are planning Nortack's 1988 audit engagement and are evalu-
ating its internal controls to determine the extent to which you will rely on them 
in planning the year-end audit work. For sixteen randomly ordered cases, you 
will be presented with a portion of  a cash disbursement internal control ques-
tionnaire completed by an auditor on your staff.  For each case, you will be 
asked to assess the risk that the specified  controls could give rise to a material 
misstatement of  cash disbursements as a result of  checks being written and/or 
disbursed for  improper (unauthorized and/or invalid) purposes. Additional cash 
disbursement controls information: 
A. The authorization for  approving expenditure requests has been designated 
by the Board of  Directors at various management levels, depending upon 
the nature and amount of  the request. Expenditure authorization is indicat-
ed on purchase orders. 
B. The cash disbursement department has the responsibility for  verifying  the 
propriety of  expenditures and for  recording them in the voucher register. 
The original copy of  the voucher has a copy of  the vendor's invoice, 
receiving report and purchase order attached. 
C. Primary check signers carefully  scrutinize vouchers and supporting docu-
mentation at the time checks are signed. 
D. When they exist, second check signers are independent of  all other expen-
diture and cash disbursement functions. 
89 
References 
Alderman, C. W. and J. W. Deitrick, "Auditors' perceptions of  time budget pressures and premature 
sign-offs:  A replication and extension." Auditing:  A Journal  of  Practice and  Theory 
(Volume 2, 1982), pp. 53-68. 
Anthony, R. N., J. Dearden and V. Govindarajan, Management  Control  Systems.  7th Ed. 
Homewood, IL: Irwin. (1992). 
Bailey, A. D., L. E. Graham and J. V. Hansen, "Technological development and EDP." In A. R. 
Abdel-khalik and I. Solomon, Eds. Research Opportunities  In  Auditing:  The  Second  Decade. 
Sarasota: American Accounting Association Auditing Section (1988), pp. 57-94. 
Beach, L. and T. Mitchell, "A contingency model for  the selection of  decision strategies." Academy 
of  Management  Review (1978), pp. 439-449. 
Ben Zur, H. and S. J. Breznitz, "The effects  of  time pressure on risky choice behavior." Acta 
Psychologica  (Volume 47, 1981), pp. 89-104. 
Billings, R. S. and L. L. Scherer, "The effects  of  response mode and importance on decision-making 
strategies: Judgment versus choice." Organizational  Behavior and  Human  Decision Processes 
(Volume 41, 1988), pp. 1-19. 
Bowden, E. M., "Accessing relevant information  during problem solving: Time constraints on 
search in the problem space." Memory  Cognition  (Volume 13, 1985), pp. 280-286. 
Brown, C. E. and I. Solomon, "Configural  information  processing in control risk appraisal." 
Auditing:  A Journal  of  Practice & Theory  ( Volume 13, 1990), pp. 17-38. 
Brown, C. E. and I. Solomon, "Configural  information  processing in auditing: The role of  domain 
specific  knowledge." The  Accounting Review (Volume 66, 1991), pp. 100-119. 
Choo, F. and I. R. C. Eggleton, "The effect  of  time pressure on auditors' internal control judg-
ments." Unpublished working paper (Victoria University of  Wellington. 1982). 
Choo, F. and M. Firth, "The effect  of  time pressure on auditors' configural  information  processing." 
Unpublished working paper (San Francisco State University, 1992). 
Christensen-Szalanski, J. J. J., "A further  examination of  the selection of  problem solving strategies: 
The effects  of  deadlines and analytic aptitudes." Organization  Behavior and  Human 
Performance  (Volume 25, 1980), pp. 107-122. 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations. New 
York: AICPA (1978). 
Davis, J. S. and I. Solomon, "Experience, expertise, and expert-performance  research in public 
accounting." Journal  of  Accounting Literature  (1989), pp. 150-164. 
Hitt, M. A. and S. H. Barr, "Managerial selection decision models: Examination of  Configural  Cue 
Processing." Journal  of  Applied  Psychology  (Volume 74, 1989). pp. 53-61. 
Kelly, T. and L. Margheim, "The impact of  time budget pressure, personality, and leadership vari-
ables on dysfunctional  auditor behavior." Auditing:  A Journal  of  Practice and  Theory  (Spring, 
1990), pp. 21-42. 
Kelly, T. and R. Seiler, "Auditor stress and time budgets." The  CPA Journal  (1982),  pp. 24-34. 
Kermis, G.F. and S. Mahapatra, "An empirical study of  the effects  of  time pressure on audit time 
allocations." Advances  In  Accounting  (Volume 2, 1985), pp. 261-273. 
McDaniel, L. S., "The effects  of  time pressure and audit program structure on audit performance." 
Journal  of  Accounting Research (Volume 28, 1990), pp. 267-285. 
McDaniel, L. S., "The effects  of  audit program structure on auditors' processing strategies. 
Unpublished working paper (1992). 
Pachella, R. G., "The interpretation of  reaction time in information  processing research." In B. H. 
Kantowitz Ed. Human  Information  Processing: Tutorials  in Performance  and  Cognition, 
(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum & Associates, 1974), pp. 41-82. 
Payne, J. W., "Contingent decision behavior." Psychological  Bulletin  (Volume 92, 1982), pp. 382-
402. 
Payne, J. W., J. R. Bettman and E. J. Johnson, "The adaptive decision maker: Effort  and accuracy in 
choice." In R. M. Hogarth Ed. Insights  in Decision Making:  Theory  and  Applications—  A 
Tribute  to Hillel  J.  Einhorn, Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, (1990), pp. 129-153. 
Payne, J. W., J. R. Bettman and E. J. Johnson, "Adaptive strategy selection in decision making." 
Journal  of  Experimental  Psychology:  Learning, Memory,  and  Cognition  (Volume 14, 1988), pp. 
534-552. 
Report of  the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (1987). 
Rothstein, H. G., "The effects  of  time pressure on judgment in multiple cue probability learning." 
Organizational  Behavior and  Human  Decision Processes (Volume 37, 1986), pp. 83-92. 
90 
Simon, H. A., "A behavioral model of  rational choice." Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics (1955), pp. 
69, 99-118. 
Solomon, I. and M. D. Shields., "Judgment and decision research in auditing." In R. H. Ashton and 
A. H. Ashton, Eds. Judgment  and  Decision Research in Accounting and  Auditing,  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, (forthcoming,  1993). 
Tversky, A., "Elimination by aspects: A theory of  choice." Psychological  Bulletin  (Volume 79, 
1972), pp. 281-299. 
Wallsten, T. S. and C. Barton. "Processing probabilistic multidimensional information  for  deci-
sions." Journal  of  Experimental  Psychology:  Learning, Memory,  and  Cognition  (Volume 8, 
1982), pp. 361-384. 
Wright, P., "The harassed decision maker: Time pressures, distractions, and the use of  evidence." 
Journal  of  Marketing  Research (Vol. 44, 1974), pp. 429-443. 
91 
